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The Ionospheric Scintillation eXplorer (ISX) mission is a collaboration between SRI International and Cal Poly. 
 The ISX space weather investigation seeks to better understand the physics of naturally occurring Equatorial Spread 
F ionospheric irregularities by deploying a passive UHF radio scintillation receiver.  Rocket Lab’s Electron-4 launch 
vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly sun synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the Earth, however 
contact was never made with the spacecraft.  Since this anomaly, Cal Poly has taken an extensive look into the 
possible failure causes on ISX, including a system level fault tree and additional testing with the engineering test 
unit. The primary takeaway from the failure analysis is the importance of testing beyond what is considered normal 
for CubeSats. The second main conclusion reinforces the important role that adequately documenting the spacecraft 
design, fabrication, and testing plays in performing a post hoc failure analysis. In addition to presenting analysis 
outcomes, this paper addresses both of these main takeaways. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ionospheric Scintillation eXplorer (ISX) mission is 
an NSF funded collaboration between Cal Poly’s 
CubeSat Lab (CPCL) and SRI International.   ISX seeks 
to better understand the physics of naturally occurring 
Equatorial Spread F ionospheric irregularities by 
deploying a passive UHF radio scintillation receiver. 
Plasma irregularities are naturally occurring 
ionospheric structures that can significantly degrade the 
performance of satellite-based communication and 
navigation systems. In particular, ionospheric storms 
causing major equatorial ionospheric disturbances 
strongly degrade Global Positioning System (GPS) 
signals over the equatorial regions. 
ISX was launched on December 16th, 2018 as part of 
the ELaNa-19 mission.  Rocket Lab’s Electron-4 launch 
vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly sun 
synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the 
Earth, however contact was never made with the 
spacecraft.  Since this anomaly, Cal Poly has taken an 
extensive look into the possible causes of this failure 
mode on ISX, including a system level fault tree and 
additional testing with the engineering test unit. 
The failure analysis included reviewing design, 
processes, procedures, and potential anomalies that may 
have slipped through the cracks.  A methodic approach 
to failure analysis is even more important in a 
university setting due to the high turnover rates of 
students and the number of other activities vying for 
their limited time.  Documenting failures, solutions, and 
lessons learned allows the organization to grow, rather 
than remain stagnant.  The process begins by 
determining every possible cause of a no-contact 
condition on orbit, including all material, electrical, and 
software faults.  Then, all available documentation is 
reviewed for any evidence that would provide insight 
into each possible cause.  An additional benefit of this 
process is that it highlights specific areas where 
additional documentation or inspections are warranted. 
 Additional testing, using the flight-similar engineering 
unit, is performed as appropriate.  From there, the likely 
causes of the anomaly are identified, and process 
changes for future missions are put into place. 
The primary takeaway from the failure analysis is the 
importance of testing beyond what is considered normal 
for CubeSats.  The second main conclusion reinforces 
the important role that adequately documenting the 
spacecraft design, fabrication, and testing plays in 
performing a post hoc failure analysis.  The remaining 
sections of this paper include a more detail description 
of ISX’s mission, a more detail description of the 
spacecraft architecture, a recap of the most applicable 
branches in the fault tree, and a conclusion that 
addresses the main takeaways. 
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ISX MISSION 
ISX is an ionospheric passive UHF radio mission 
developed in response to NSF’s 2014 CubeSat-based 
Science Missions for Geospace and Atmospheric 
Research solicitation. ISX mission goals are to better 
understand the physics of naturally occurring Equatorial 
Spread F ionospheric irregularities—a space weather 
phenomenon that can severely degrade the performance 
of U.S. national communication and navigation assets. 
Deploying a passive radio scintillation receiver, the ISX 
mission will acquire worldwide digital television 
broadcast signals with an on-orbit CubeSat radio 
receiver to yield a unique geometry for characterizing 
the climatology and evolution of 100-m-scale 
ionospheric structures—features inaccessible to ground-
based observation. These globally observed ionospheric 
irregularities, driven by interaction of naturally 
occurring strong electric fields and ionospheric plasma 
gradients, result from a chaotic interplay of solar 
magnetic and ultraviolet forcing of Earth’s upper 
atmosphere.  
The ISX mission investigates ionospheric irregularities 
from multiple vantage points to gain insight into 
dissipation of Equatorial Spread F (ESF) structures, 
which have been measured only in two dimensions. By 
gauging the 3D distribution of these ionospheric 
irregularities, the ISX mission will advance the state of 
space weather forecasting. 
SPACECRAFT DESIGN OVERVIEW 
ISX is a 3U CubeSat [1], based on Cal Poly’s in-house 
satellite bus design.  Figure 1 shows the spacecraft’s 
physical layout, identifying the key components.  The 
primary C&DH board, with flight heritage on five other 
Cal Poly missions, combines traditional C&DH 
functionality with EPS and UHF communication 
support in a highly integrated package. The primary 
processor is an Atmel ATSAM91G45 running a heavily 
customized embedded Linux operating system. It 
provides general management of the satellite bus and 
provide an interface to the UHF radio that commands 
the satellite. It contains 64MB of redundant flight 
software storage. An additional 512MB of NAND flash 
memory and 8GB on a microSD card is available to 
store telemetry data. 
The integrated UHF radio is combined with a near 
omni-directional L dipole antenna to serve as the 
primary radio for commanding the spacecraft. A second 
L dipole is located on the nadir pointing end of the 
satellite to serve as the 500-700MHz antenna for the 
ISX payload receiver. The UHF radio is capable of up 
to 1W of transmit power with years of operating 
heritage at 9600 bits per second. 
The avionics bus incorporates a built-in EPS that 
includes a variety of electrical protection systems. Four 
8.4W (on Sun nominal) 3U panels support power 
generation, and a standalone battery pack of nine 
Lithium-Ion cells provides 77 Wh of storage.  The solar 
panels charge the battery pack at a nominal 11.1V with 
a maximum voltage of 12.6V.  Power for the satellite is 
provided by 24 UTJ solar cells mounted on the side 
panels.  All the cells on one panel are connected in 
series.  Each panel is connected in parallel using direct 
energy transfer. 
ISX uses six solar angle sensors, coupled with six tri-
axis magnetometers to provide the system with 3-axis 
attitude determination. The spacecraft includes this 
variety of sensors to introduce redundancy and provide 
multiple measurements for the attitude filter. The 
Figure 1: The physical layout of the 3U ISX CubeSat 
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orbital position of the spacecraft is determined using a 
GPS receiver which can utilize GPS and GLONASS 
constellations. This orbital position is used to assign a 
coordinate location and time to scientific 
measurements, and feed into the on-board IGRF 
magnetic field model used in conjunction with the 
attitude determination.  Attitude control is achieved by 
a passive magnetic system consisting of natural 
magnets to align the satellite with the Earth’s magnetic 
field. 
The ISX payload was designed and fabricated by SRI 
International. It contains the sensitive SDR to observe 
the digital TV transmissions, a SATA III SSD storage 
device for recording data during an observation, a 
Tegra-3 processor for post-processing the data after an 
observation, and the necessary bus connections for 
moving the data around.  Since it isn’t important to the 
failure analysis, further details of the payload 
architecture are omitted from this work. 
LAUNCH AND ANOMOLY 
ISX was launched on December 16th, 2018 from 
Launch Complex 1 located in Mahia, New Zealand, as 
part of the ELaNa-19 mission.  Rocket Lab’s Electron-4 
launch vehicle successfully placed ISX into a nearly 
sun synchronous orbit 500km above the surface of the 
Earth.  Successful deployment was confirmed both by 
sensors on the launch vehicle and the number of distinct 
objects detected by radar tracking facilities. 
ISX was configured to automatically deploy its antenna 
165 minutes after separation from the launch vehicle, at 
which time it should begin autonomously transmitting a 
telemetry beacon every 7 seconds.  Cal Poly began 
tracking ISX immediately after launch but was unable 
to observe the beacon or otherwise establish contact 
with the spacecraft. This early setback was initially 
attributed to the uncertainty caused by ISX being one in 
a cluster of fifteen spacecraft deployed at a similar time.  
As the days wore on and reports from amateur 
operators trickled in, it became increasingly clear the 
spacecraft was not transmitting.  ISX was monitored for 
nine months from multiple geographically different 
tracking stations without observing a single 
transmission. 
In addition to monitoring, Cal Poly attempted active 
recovery of ISX.  The spacecraft is designed such that 
the radio, when not actively transmitting, is always 
listening for ground commands.  This provides an 
opportunity to uplink commands even if the downlink 
RF chain isn’t working correctly.  Specifically, the 
command to deploy the antenna and turn on the 
transmitter was sent to ISX multiple times in case the 
on-board logic had malfunctioned.  A basic link check, 
in the form of a “ping” command, was also attempted 
without success. 
FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Cal Poly undertook a months-long fault tree analysis [2] 
after it became clear the spacecraft was experiencing an 
anomaly.  Although the analysis didn’t identify a single 
responsible fault, the process and information generated 
is beneficial for future missions.  During the course of 
the failure analysis numerous tests were performed on 
the ISX engineering unit to either refute or support 
branches of the fault tree.  Documentation kept during 
the development and testing of ISX, including 
procedures, test reports, and pictures, were also 
reviewed during the investigation. 
The investigation was broken into three top-level 
categories: material, electrical, and software.  Important 
contributors from each category are detailed in the 
following sections. 
MATERIAL FAILURE MODES 
This category includes all material-related failures that 
could have led to the spacecraft anomaly.  The 
possibilities presented here are the failure of a 
deployment switch, thermal damage to PCB traces, the 
failure of a wire modification, and the failure of the 
antenna to deploy. 
ISX has two deployment switches, connected in series, 
that turn the spacecraft on after separation from the 
launch vehicle.  If one, or both, of these switches failed 
the spacecraft would not turn on.  Experience with the 
switches across multiple missions has taught us the tiny 
devices are fragile and the plastic lever arm that 
actuates the button can snap off easily.  However, when 
the arm breaks the switch fails closed and the spacecraft 
would still boot.  The possibility of the wire connecting 
the switch to the electronics breaking due to the launch 
environment was also considered, but considered 
unlikely based on assembly documentation, the 
expected low loads on the solder joints themselves, and 
two prior vibration tests of the flight unit to GEVS 
levels without a similar failure.  It was determined that 
the anomaly was unlikely the result of a deployment 
switch failure. 
ISX experienced a ground testing anomaly after a 
thermal backout test involving one of the traces on the 
PCB that controls the power-on sequence.  The trace 
expanded and cracked in such a way that minor 
physical pressure was required to the board in order for 
it to turn on.  This issue was resolved pre-flight by 
adding a wire modification that bypasses the fragile 
trace.  After the modification was added the board 
returned to its expected behavior.  It is possible that 
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other traces may have experienced a similar failure, 
however that possibility is reduced both by ground 
environmental testing that originally identified the 
broken trace and the small number of times we have 
successfully flown the same avionics board with the 
same wire modification.  It is also possible that the wire 
modification itself failed.  The light weight of the 
additional wire, plus installation procedures that include 
both staking and conformal coating, and vibrations 
testing of the modification make this particular failure 
also unlikely.  Figure 2 shows the wire modification 
staked to the system board prior to conformal coating.  
 
Figure 2: Wire mod to bypass fragile trace applied 
to the system board 
Another possibility considered is that the spacecraft 
antenna failed to deploy.  There are two primary 
concerns if the antenna doesn’t deploy.  First, the signal 
strength of the radio transmissions is noticeably 
reduced, making it nearly impossible to close the link, 
however the transmissions are typically still visible 
using a software defined radio.  One of our previous 
missions, ExoCube, experienced an antenna failure 
which resulted in this situation.  That failure was most 
likely caused by a bad solder joint.  Based on the 
lessons learn from ExoCube the antenna deployment 
mechanism was redesigned and all solder connections 
are now on a PCB.  Redundant burn circuits were also 
added to allow recovery if one of the circuits fails.  This 
new design, as seen in Figure 3, was extensively tested 
on the ground with different simulated environments.  It 
has also successfully flown on the DAVE mission prior 
to ISX.  Since no signal was observed from ISX across 
many months of passes this failure mode is unlikely to 
have occurred. 
 
Figure 3: The ISX -Z panel, showing the antenna 
deployment mechanism in the lower-right corner.  
Note the antenna is deployed in this picture. 
The second concerning outcome of a failed antenna 
deployment is that power reflects off the stowed 
antenna and causes the power amplifier to blow out.  
This creates a break in the RF chain preventing all 
transmissions.  This failure has been observed multiple 
times while ground testing radio hardware when proper 
handling procedures were not followed.  There is no 
telemetry or other data available to refute this, other 
than the extensive testing and flight heritage of the 
deployment mechanism. 
ELECTRICAL FAILURE MODES 
Causes evaluated in this category are all related to 
electrical failures that may result in the spacecraft’s 
failure to transmit.  The three modes discussed in this 
paper include the failure of the antenna burn resistor, a 
low battery voltage during the burn event, and a failure 
to charge the onboard batteries. 
The failure of both burn resistors would cause the 
antenna to not deploy.  The consequences of a stowed 
antenna were discussed in the material section.  The 
process of heating up the resistor enough to melt the 
restraining line requires exceeding the design limit of 
the part, causing internal damage to the component.  
Ground testing showed a resistor is viable for three 
burns before it needs to be replaced.  Due to this 
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limitation the burn resistors flown on ISX had never 
been used (replacing them after testing is part of the 
standard operating procedure).  They are also protected 
from accidental burns by shorting them with an 
ammeter.  These procedures, and the redundant 
resistors, make it unlikely a faulty burn resistor caused 
the ISX anomaly. 
Another possibility is the battery voltage was too low to 
properly drive the burn resistors, but still high enough 
to operate the other spacecraft electronics.  A low 
battery state was observed on the flight unit during the 
final battery charge activity.  Due to launch vehicle 
delays the spacecraft sat integrated in its dispenser for 
approximately seven months.  There was an opportunity 
about a month prior to launch to de-integrate and 
recharge the batteries.  At that time the batteries were 
too low for the spacecraft to boot, increasing the 
likelihood of a low state of charge on deployment.  
However, the solar cells on ISX should have been able 
to provide enough charge in the time between dispenser 
deployment and antenna deployment to drive the burn 
resistors. 
This naturally leads to question whether ISX 
experienced a charging failure, which, when combined 
with a low deployment state of charge, prevented the 
antenna from deploying or the radio from transmitting.  
During spacecraft checkout all cells were shown to 
generate voltage in the cleanroom.  Absent an accurate 
solar simulator, however, their actual power generation 
was never measured.  Given the redundancy that comes 
with the electrical layout of 4 series of cells, it is less 
likely that all four groups failed at the same time 
independently of each other.  The passive magnets used 
to orient the spacecraft ensure the cells are illuminated, 
reducing the possibility that poor pointing impacts 
power generation.  The overall power budget for the 
spacecraft without the payload operating (the default 
state on deployment) was exceptionally positive, 
reducing the likelihood that an under provisioned 
system prevented charging. 
SOFTWARE FAILURE MODES 
The failure analysis for ISX focused on two areas, a 
general startup error and a timing error within the radio 
code.   
The CPCL flight software is based on Buildroot 
embeded Linux [3] using busybox [4].  The startup 
sequence uses a System V style init script architecture 
[5].  One of the initialization scripts, named “S61”, 
would occasionally hang for an extended period of time 
on startup.  In all observed ground cases, the hardware 
watchdog built into the spacecraft’s avionics would 
successfully recover from the hang.  If the hang 
occurred on orbit, and the built-in recovery mechanisms 
couldn’t resolve it, the spacecraft couldn’t boot.  While 
possible, this was rated as an acceptable risk due to the 
numerous ground observations of the recovery process 
never failing. 
During the later stages of testing the ISX flight software 
a radio issue was identified in the transmit chain of the 
half-duplex radio.  Based on diagnostics that the time it 
was determined the most likely cause was a timing 
issue when the software didn’t wait long enough 
between switching the RF amplifier on and transmitting 
data.  A change was made to increase the time between 
the two events.  After the change the anomaly was not 
observed.  The same anomaly was not observed on 
previous missions, despite using the same hardware and 
software.  It is possible that batch inconsistencies in the 
underlying electronics either masked or exasperated the 
anomaly. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ISX anomaly and resulting fault tree analysis lead 
to a number of valuable conclusions.  First, it 
emphasized the need to always test the spacecraft well 
beyond the launch-provider requirements.  That was 
done with ISX, including many antenna deployment 
and radio tests, but it was insufficient to identify the 
anomaly on the ground. 
The second takeaway is that the importance of 
documentation in an anomaly investigation cannot be 
understated.  There were many branches to the fault tree 
that should have been deemed highly unlikely, but, due 
to less rigorous documentation, could not be closed out.  
Recollections of responsible engineers are not sufficient 
in this case. 
Finally, specific details about potential anomaly causes 
is expected to help the larger CubeSat community in 
there continued push to improve mission success. 
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